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Code Sections Affected
Civil Code §§ 51.7, 52, 52.1 (amended).
AB 2719 (Wesson); 2000 STAT. Ch. 98
I. INTRODUCTION
While walking along a beach in California, a man was beaten and left near death
with permanent brain damage because a group of youths believed he was gay.' In
Wyoming, twenty-two-year-old Mathew Shepard, was beaten, pistol-whipped,
burned, tied to a fence, and left to eventually die simply because of his sexual
orientation. 2 In Arlington, Texas, Donald Thomas was shot at close range in a drive-
by shooting, by white supremacists who targeted him because he was African-
American A Minnesota college dormitory kitchen, known to supply kosher food
for Jewish students, was vandalized by "Skinheads ' 4 who left Anti-Semitic
markings and "excrement on a cooking utensil."5
These examples detail, in part, the brutality which some Americans encounter
on a continuing basis. 6 Hate crimes-crimes that target individuals because of their
membership in a particular social group 7 -carry a significant sting, as they have a
"more debilitating effect on the victim."' 8 The pain of a hate crime is particularly
detrimental to the victim because it is often committed against her on the basis of
her "immutable characteristics"-those personal characteristics of which the victim
has no control.9 Indeed, the effects of a crime motivated by hate are not limited to
1. David G. Braithwaite, Note, Combatting Hate Crimes: The Use of Civil Alternatives to Criminal
Prosecutions, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 243 (1996).
2. See Craig L. Uhrich, Comment, Hate Crimes Legislation: A Policy Analysis, 36 Hous. L. REv. 1467,
1468 (1999) (chronicling the death of Mathew Shepard as a hate-based crime motivated by his sexuality).
3. See id. (detailing the shooting and killing of Donald Thomas by White Supremacists because of his race).
4. See The Staff of the Syracuse Journal of Legislation and Policy, Project, Crimes Motivated by Hatred:
The Constitutionality and Impact of Crime Legislation in the United States, 1 SYRACUSE J. LEGIS. & POL'Y 29, 33
(1995) (noting that "Skinheads," a White Supremacist group known for violence against minorities, are also referred
to as "Neo-Nazis").
5. See id. (citing recent examples of hate crimes).
6. Id.
7. See Uhrich, supra note 2, at 1469 (defining a hate crime).
8. In re Joshua H., 13 Cal. App. 4th 1734, 1748, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291, 300 (1993).
9. Id. Some critics argue that the term "immutable characteristics" does not include groups whose
classification is based on, for example, religion, political beliefs or even sexual orientation. See generally John Hans
Thomas, Comment, Seeing Through a Glass, Darkly: The Social Context of "Particular Social Groups" in Lwin
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the victim.' ° Because such attacks often target individuals on the basis of specific
characteristics, the community to which the victims belong also experiences the
effects, as they are left to wonder who among them will become the next victim."
The California Legislature has responded to this inhumanity by enacting laws
aimed at curbing the occurrence of hate crimes.' 2 Chapter 98 seeks to further protect
hate crime victims, and deter hate crimes in general, by allowing an action for civil
damages to be brought on a victim's behalf.' 3 In addition to protecting individuals
against hate crimes, prior law has sought to protect the victim's constitutional rights,
found in both the California and United States Constitutions.14 However, recent case
law has undermined the ability of courts to protect these more general constitutional
rights under existing law. 5 Instead of extending the ability to bring an action for a
v. INS, 1999 B.Y.U.L. REv. 799, 804-07 (1999) (noting criticism for use of the term "immutable characteristics"
for particular social groups whose identity is based on characteristics such as religion or political affiliation); Katrina
C. Rose, Comment, The Transsexual and the Damage Done: The Fourth Court ofAppeals Opens PanDOMA 's Box
By Closing the Door on Transsexuals'Right to Marry, 9 LAW & SEX. 1, 8-26 (1999/2000) (noting that one's sexual
orientation and/or sexual identity is a debated issue with respect to it being an immutable characteristic). One might
argue that such characteristics are actually "voluntary" choices, while, for example, race and nationality are more
appropriately identified as characteristics which cannot be changed, and are, therefore, "truly immutable." See
Thomas, supra, at 804. However, Thomas argues for a broader definition of immutable characteristics including
not only those characteristics which "cannot be changed, but also those that a person should not have to change."
See id. at 804 (arguing for a more extensive definition of immutable characteristics including members of a
particular social group who share "a characteristic that either is beyond the power of the individual members of the
group to change or is so fundamental to their identities or consciences that it ought not be required to be changed").
With respect to one's sexual orientation or sexual identity, Rose argues that "the concept of sex" is determined by
chromosonal and hormonal fetal development. Rose, supra, at 11-12. Accordingly, this view of sexual identity is
consistent with it being an "immutable characteristic." Id. Furthermore, Rose posits that "male" and "female" should
not be the only sex classifications, rather sexuality occurs on a continuum, as a result of immutable chromosonal
and hormonal characteristics. Id. at 8-12. In short, Rose suggests that one's sexual identity should not be limited
to a doctor's identification of an individual as either male or female at birth based "on the presence or absence of
a penis." Id. at 9.
10. See The Staff of the Syracuse Journal of Legislation and Policy, supra note 4, at 29 (identifying the far-
reaching effects of hate based crimes by stating the effects of a crime motivated by hate extend beyond the victim
and "cast a shadow of fear and terror throughout entire communities").
11. Howard P. Berkowitz, Q: Are Hate-Crime Laws in Keeping With a Free Society? Yes: Such Laws Send
a Powerful Message to Racists Everywhere, INSIGHT MAGAZINE, Sept. 20, 1999, at 40, available in 1999 WL
27691807.
12. See, e.g., Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, 1987 Cal. Stat. ch. 1277, sec. 2, at 4544 (identifying its aim to
protect minorities from discrimination).
13. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 52(b)(2) (amended by Chapter 98) (indicating that a $25,000 civil penalty may
be awarded to an aggrieved individual whether brought by the individual herself, or by the Attorney General and
any district or city attorney).
14. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1 (amended by Chapter 98) (providing for the ability of an individual to
institute a civil action for a violation of state or federal constitutional rights "in order to protect the peaceable
exercise or enjoyment of the right or rights secured").
15. See Boccato v. City of Hermosa Beach, 29 Cal. App. 4th 1797, 1809, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 282, 290 (1994)
(requiring that an action brought under Civil Code section 52.1 must allege that the plaintiff who claims interference
of his or her rights also allege that this interference was due to his or her "race, color, religion, ancestry, national
origin, political affiliation, sex, sexual orientation, age, disability, or position in a labor dispute, as set forth in Civil
Code Section 51.7." "The failure to so allege constitutes a failure to state a cause of action under [section 52.1 ]").
Id. In short, the Boccato court held that Civil Code sections 51.7 and 52.1 must be read together, and therefore,
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violation of such rights to all individuals, recent case law holds that only an
individual who can demonstrate that the violation was motivated by her membership
in a protected minority class may bring such an action.16 Chapter 98 rectifies this
misinterpretation and effectively supersedes the holding of these cases; thus, an
individual who is not a member of an enumerated minority class is allowed to bring
an action for a violation of his constitutional rights. 7
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Limiting the Efficacy of Hate Crime Legislation
Civil Code section 51.7 established that "[a]ll persons ... [in] this state have the
right to be free from any violence.., because of their" membership in specifically
enumerated minority classes. 8 Civil Code section 52 provided that civil damages
would be awarded to individuals deprived of such a right under Civil Code section
51.7.19 One possible interpretation of these provisions would allow only the person
whose rights had been violated to bring an action.20 The danger of such a finding
was that if a victim failed to bring a lawsuit, it was not possible for another person,
such as the Attorney General, to bring an action on the victim's behalf.21 Due to this
restriction, the ability of the provisions to reach their full potential of deterrence to
hate crimes was diminished.22
B. A Limit on Constitutional Rights
Additionally, in October of 1994, the California Second District Court of
Appeal delivered a decision in Boccato v. City of Hermosa Beach23 which
unless an individual was a member of an enumerated minority class, he could not bring an action under Civil Code
section 52.1 for a violation of one of his constitutional rights. Id.; see also Nelson v. City of Irvine, 143 F.3d 1196,
1206-07 (9th Cir. 1998) (following the decision in Boccato; thus, requiring Civil Code sections 52.1 and 51.7 to
be read together); Cabesuela v. Browning-Ferris Industries of California, 68 Cal. App. 4th 101, 110-11,80 Cal. Rptr.
2d 60, 64-65 (1998) (same).
16. Supra note 15.
17. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 52.1(g) (amended by Chapter 98) (stating that "[a]n action brought pursuant to
this section is independent of any other action, remedy, or procedure that may be available to an aggrieved
individual under any other provision of law, including, but not limited to, an action, remedy, or procedure brought
pursuant to section 51.7").
18. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.7(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 2001).
19. Id. § 52(b)(2) (amended by Chapter 98).
20. See id. (lacking the language necessary to indicate that a person other than the victim of rights
enumerated in Civil Code section 51.7 could bring the action on the individual's behalf).
21. Id.
22. See Letter from Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, to California Governor Gray Davis at 2
(July 6,2000) [hereinafter Lockyer-Davis Letter] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (indicating that Chapter
98 will serve as a deterrent to hate crimes "regardless of whether the action is brought by a public official or the
person whose rights were violated").
23. 29 Cal. App. 4th 1797, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 282 (1994).
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interpreted the Civil Code to require that these provisions be read in connection with
one another.24 Section 52.1 of the California Civil Code provided a cause of action
for violations of rights "secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or
of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of [California]. 25 This section
provided for an extension of these rights to "[a]ny individual" and did not enumerate
any further requirement.26
However, the court in Boccato interpreted the law as requiring an individual
bringing an action under Civil Code section 52.1 to demonstrate that the alleged
violation of her rights was motivated by her membership in a protected class
enumerated in Civil Code section 51.7. 27Consequently, under Boccato and the cases
which have followed its holding, an individual claiming, for example, a violation
of his right to vote under Civil Code section 52.1 would be denied recovery unless
he could demonstrate that the violation was motivated by his membership in a
protected class enumerated in Civil Code section 51.7.29
The court's conclusion in Boccato was surprising given the language of Civil
Code section 52.1(g), which specifically states that "[a]ctions under this section
shall be independent of any other remedies or procedures that may be available to
an aggrieved person under any other provision of law."3° Nevertheless, the Boccato
court reasoned that the Bane Act,31 which enacted Civil Code section 52.1, was a
response to an increase in the number of hate crimes being committed against
minority victims.32 The court argued that the California Legislature enacted Civil
Code section 52.1 to protect the minority classes outlined in Civil Code section
51.7. Therefore, the court concluded that Civil Code section 52.1 must be read in
connection with the class of minorities contained in Civil Code section 51.7. As
a result, only an individual who was a member of a class enumerated in Civil Code
section 51.7 could bring an action under Civil Code section 52.1. While the
drafters of Civil Code section 52.1 may have been interested in protecting minorities
against hate crimes, the language of the statute provides for the protection of the
24. Id. at 1809, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 282,290 (requiring that, Civil Code section 52.1 be read in connection with
Civil Code section 51.7; thus, forcing an individual making a claim for a violation of her constitutional rights to also
allege that the violation was motivated by her membership in a minority class).
25. CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1(a) (amended by Chapter 98).
26. Id. § 52.1 (amended by Chapter 98). But see id. (requiring that an allegation of a constitutional right
violation be made in order to bring an action).
27. Id. §51.7 (West Supp. 2001); 29 Cal. App. 4th 1797, 1809, Cal. Rptr. 2d 282, 290 (1994).
28. Supra note 15.
29. CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1 (amended by Chapter 98); Id. § 51.7 (West 1982 & Supp. 2000).
30. Id. § 52.1(g) (amended by Chapter 98).
31. Supra note 12.
32. Boccato, 29 Cal. App. 4th at 1808, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 290 (1994).
33. Id., 35 Cal. Rptr. at 290 (noting that the protected classes found in Civil Code section 51.7 include "race,
color, religion, ancestry, national origin, political affiliation, sex, sexual orientation, age, disability, or position in
a labor dispute").
34. Id. at 1809, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
35. Id.
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State and federal constitutional rights of any individual, not just those among the
classes enumerated in Civil Code section 51.7.36
III. CHAPTER 98
Chapter 98 accomplishes two major goals. First, it strengthens the intention of
the Ralph Act37 "to give law enforcement a strong tool to deter crimes against
minorities. 38 It does this by clarifying that an action for a civil penalty may be
brought on a victim's behalf by the Attorney General, or by a district or city
attorney.39 The Attorney General of California, the sponsor of Chapter 98, suggests
that providing for the recovery of a civil penalty in this way should serve to
discourage further hate crimes against minorities.4n
Secondly, Chapter 98 clarifies Civil Code section 52.1, thus clarifying the intent
of the law and nullifying the Boccato decision.4a Chapter 98 corrects any confusion
contained in the language of Civil Code section 52.1(g) by amending it to
specifically state that "[a]n action brought pursuant to this section is independent of
any other action including .... an action ... brought pursuant to [Civil Code]
section 51.7. As a result of this clarification, a victim of a constitutional rights
violation does not have to meet the additional burden of demonstrating that the
violation was motivated by her membership in a minority class.43
IV. ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER 98
Due to the destructive effects of hate crimes,44 limiting their continual
occurrence is a crucial social goal. a5 One response is to enact laws providing for civil
suits.46 This sends a strong message of deterrence to those who would engage in
such conduct, and seeks to punish the perpetrator of the crime while compensating
36. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.7 (West 1982 & 2001 Supp.)
37. Ralph Civil Rights Act of 1976, 1976 Cal. Stat. ch. 1293, sec. 2, at 5778 (amended by Chapter 98)
(enacting Civil Code section 51.7).
38. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2719, at 7 (June 6, 2000).
39. CAL. CIV. CODE § 52(b)(2) (amended by Chapter 98).
40. Supra note 22.
41. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1(g) (amended by Chapter 98) (providing that "[a]n action brought pursuant
to this section is independent of any other action, remedy, or procedure that may be available to an aggrieved
individual under any other provision of law, including, but not limited to, an action, remedy, or procedure brought
pursuant to section 51.7").
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Supra Part 1.
45. See Berkowitz, supra note 11, at 40 (stating that "[e]veryone agrees that something, legislative or
otherwise, must be done to stem the tide of hate").
46. See Braithwaite, supra note 1, at 254 (arguing that when combined with a criminal prosecution, civil
suits serve as effective deterrents to hate crime as they can provide "actual damages, emotional distress ...
forfeiture" and "[p]erhaps more importantly .... punitive damages").
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the victim. 47 By providing that a person other than a victim can bring an action for
a hate crime, Chapter 98 expands the scope of the law and thereby comes closer to
realizing the aforementioned goals.
48
Additionally, for a number of reasons, including a desire by cities to project a
safe image, hate crimes often go unreported. 49 By expanding the scope of individuals
able to bring such actions, Chapter 98 assists in rectifying the problem of unreported
hate crimes, while serving as a deterrent for crimes yet to be committed. °
Generally, critics attack hate crime legislation, notably at the federal level, for
targeting beliefs and attitudes--essentially arguing that such measures are
inconsistent with the First Amendment's protections of free speech.5' The danger in
enacting hate crime legislation, according to one commentator, is that in doing so,
"we lay the groundwork for truly breathtaking chills on free speech. ' 2 While the
laws may target "genuinely dangerous" speech, there is a risk that it will extend to
"speech that is merely offensive, unfashionable, careless, or at odds with the
reigning egalitarian orthodoxies of the day."
53
In response to this challenge, proponents argue that hate crime legislation is not
focused on speech, but rather only addresses the conduct of the crime.54 In this way
individuals are free to express their beliefs about suspect classes,55 but if they act
upon these views in violent or unlawfully harmful ways, hate crime statutes will be
triggered.56 Agreeing with this position, the Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he
First Amendment does not protect violence. 57 The Court reasons that offensive
47. See id. at 252-54 (asserting that "anti-bias statutes [have] proved highly productive in vindicating the
rights of individuals who had faced unjust discrimination").
48. CAL. CIV. CODE § 52 (amended by Chapter 98).
49. Peter Y. Hong, Panel Seeks to Raise Awareness of Hate Crimes Violence: State Commission Urges
Victims as well as Police to Report Incidents, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2000, at B 1, available in 2000 WL 2221083;
see also id. (urging, that hate crimes are unreported because "[p]olice departments may also focus on crimes such
as assaults without pursuing the possibility that such offenses might be hate crimes".., can keep a community from
learning of tensions among residents." Some hate crimes are not reported because the individual may "fear
deportation," "may not want their sexual orientation to be revealed," and may not trust police, because police are
sometimes the perpetrators of hate crimes, or some "may fear retaliation from their attackers").
50. Id. But see id. (noting that legislation funding "training programs that would teach police and local
officials how to properly identify, report and respond to hate crimes" may be needed to correct the problem of
unreported hate crimes).
51. E.g., Michael S. Greve, Hate Crimes and Hypocrisy, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 563,563-64(1993).
52. Id. at 568.
53. Id.
54. See Berkowitz, supra note 11, at 42 (stating that "[t]hese critics erroneously contend that such statutes
punish individuals for their beliefs and their speech"). Id. (noting that "the critics demonstrate a fundamental
misunderstanding of hate-crimes legislation as well as the First Amendment,"as "hate-crimes legislation does not
in any way target or punish speech; such statutes punish conduct only").
55. Id. In the context of the First Amendment, references to suspect classes remain largely the same as those
protected by hate crimes laws. See id. (exemplifying "race, religion, sexuality" as classes about which individuals
may express their beliefs freely via the First Amendment).
56. Id.
57. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993).
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speech is not being punished;58 rather, when a message extends to violent conduct,
"special harms" are produced which are distinct from their "communicative
impact. ' 9 The Court has concluded that this type of "special harm" is not covered
by free speech, and because it is distinct from the underlying view that a perpetrator
may have about a targeted suspect class, it is therefore, punishable.60
Critics of hate crime legislation also argue that existing law sufficiently
addresses violent crime, thereby, making such legislation superfluous. 6' Those
adhering to this position would argue, for example, that a battery is a battery,
regardless of the perpetrator's motive.62 In making this argument, the opposition to
hate crime legislation fails to recognize that a perpetrator of a hate crime may not
only be interested in harming the victim, but also intends to send a threatening
message to the victim's community. 63 Hence, hate crime legislation addresses the
larger societal impact of a hate crime, as well as the injury to the individual victim.64
V. CONCLUSION
Chapter 98 is an ostensibly simple bill which makes minor yet significant
changes to the California Civil Code. With regard to Chapter 98's expansion of
constitutional rights, the American Civil Liberties Union has noted that
constitutional rights violations can occur even where the person is not a member of
minority class. 65 Furthermore, the Attorney General believes that the purpose of
Chapter 98 is to expand the interpretation of civil rights statutes as broadly as
possible.66 In so doing, enforcement of the laws will result in greater protection of
rights and a more significant deterrent value.67
58. Id. at481-82.
59. Id. at 484.
60. Id.
61. See Marc Sandalow, House Backs Expanded Hate-Crime Legislation/Broader Definition Includes Gays,
Disabled, S. F. CHRON., Sept. 14,2000, at Al, available at 2000 WL 6491475 (observing that pending federal hate
crimes legislation was opposed by Republican leaders who "argued that violent crimes should be universally
prosecuted without regard to the motives of the assailant or the background of the victim").
62. Id.
63. See Uhrich, supra note 2, at 1497 (arguing that a hate crime is characterized by its "extreme viciousness"
which derives, "in part, [from] the perpetrator's desire to send a message to the victim and those like the victim").
64. See Berkowitz, supra note 11, at 42 (stating that "[b]y making minority communities fearful, angry and
suspicious of other groups-and of the legal structure that is supposed to protect them-these incidents can damage
the fabric of our society and fragment communities"); id. (noting that hate crimes "laws protect all Americans,
allowing them to walk the streets safe in the knowledge that their community will not tolerate violent bigotry").
65. See Letter from Francisco Lobaco, Legislative Director, and Valerie Small Navarro, Legislative
Advocate, American Civil Liberties Union, to Assembly Member Herb Wesson (Apr. 18, 2000) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (asserting that "[v]iolations of constitutional rights attach regardless of the person's race,
sex or other protected status").
66. See Lockyer-Davis Letter, supra note 22 (urging Gray Davis to support AB 2719 because of the civil
and constitutional rights protections it affords).
67. Id.
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While Chapter 98 lacks any known documented opposition, similar legislation
at the federal level is evidently controversial.68 However, when the community
impacts of hate crimes are identified, the opposition's arguments are less effective
and the need for legislation becomes clearer.69 As President Bill Clinton recently
stated in support of federal hate crime legislation, "[w]e may not ever fully conquer
the disease that afflict human hearts everywhere, the compelling need to define
ourselves up by defining someone else down ... [b]ut at least we can do more to
make sure that no one in our country is violated simply because of who they are. 7°
68. Supra Part IV.
69. Id.
70. Susan Milligan, Hate-Crimes Law Expansion Ok'd, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 14, 2000, at A25,
available in 2000 WL 3342229.
